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Courts Have the Final Say: Does the
Doctrine of "Manifest Disregard"
Promote Lawful Arbitral Awards or
Disguise Unlawful Judicial Review?
Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In exchange for a speedy, economical dispute resolution process, parties that
submit to binding arbitration assume the risk that an arbitrator might misapply the
law.2 United States Supreme Court precedent and federal law favor agreements to
arbitrate by limiting judicial review of arbitral awards and requiring courts to
"rigorously enforce arbitration agreements." 3 These judicial constraints support
the arbitral goals of efficiency and finality by reducing the risk that arbitral awards
will be vacated on appeal. To balance the risk that arbitrators may abuse this
standard of review, courts have supplemented restricted judicial review with a
doctrine that allows an arbitral award to be vacated in circumstances where the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.4 Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed 5 reaches
the outer limits of this doctrine by demonstrating how the courts can use the doc-
trine to engage in a heightened form of judicial review of arbitral awards.
][. FACTS AND HOLDING
Waddell & Reed, Inc. (Waddell & Reed), a Kansas-based securities broker-
dealer and member of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD),6 employed Stephen Sawtelle (Sawtelle) as its Connecticut representative
for seventeen years.7 Even though Sawtelle had approximately 2,800 customers
and received the "number one broker of 1996" award, Waddell & Reed fired Saw-
telle on February 10, 1997.8
Sawtelle and Waddell & Reed disputed the reason for the termination. Saw-
telle alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for testifying before the Securi-
1. 21 A.D.3d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
2. Noah Rubins, "Manifest Disregard of the Law" and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the United
States, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 363, 367 (2001).
3. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
4. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986).
5. 21 A.D. 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
6. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 103,104 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
7. Id.
8. Id. The trial court found that "until his termination, Sawtelle had been one of Waddell's most
successful salesmen, with approximately 2,800 customers, none of whom had ever made a complaint
against him. In fact, as late as February 3, 1997, Sawtelle had received accolades from Waddell for his
work and status as the 'number one broker' in 1996." Id.
1
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ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) against another Waddell & Reed broker.9
Waddell & Reed claimed Sawtelle was fired due to concern about Sawtelle's own
"improper practices."' 0 However, on a form that Waddell & Reed prepared for
the NASD, the U-5 Uniform Notice of Termination form, Waddell & Reed cited
"personality differences" as the reason for Sawtelle's termination." Other por-
tions of the form referenced customer complaints and suggested that Sawtelle was
under investigation for fraud. 12 Specifically, Waddell & Reed answered in the
affirmative two questions on the NASD U-5 Uniform Notice of Termination form
asking whether Sawtelle was under internal and external investigation for invest-
ment related business.'
3
On February 11, 1997, one day after Sawtelle's termination, Sawtelle began
working for a Waddell & Reed competitor, Hackett Associates (Hackett). 4 In
response, Waddell & Reed wrote letters to Sawtelle's customers, warning them
that there could be financial repercussions if they moved their accounts to a new
firm.' 5 Waddell & Reed then obscured customers' attempts to communicate with
Sawtelle by misdirecting Sawtelle's mail and telephone calls. 16 Waddell & Reed
also encouraged customers to complain about Sawtelle and suggested to custom-
ers that Sawtelle had engaged in criminal behavior.' 7 Waddell & Reed's efforts to
retain Sawtelle's customer base largely failed, however, as the vast majority of the
customers followed Sawtelle to Hackett.'
8
In July 1997, Sawtelle filed a claim with the NASD against Waddell and cer-
tain officers and representatives alleging tortuous interference with business ex-
pectancy and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(CUTPA).' 9 After holding over fifty days of hearings spanning two and a half
9. Id. at 104. Sawtelle testified before the SEC about David Stevenson. Stevenson was a Waddell
& Reed broker until 1996, when he was fired. Stevenson was later convicted of embezzling millions
of dollars from his clients. Id.
10. Id. at 105. In the subsequent arbitration, Waddell & Reed alleged that Sawtelle "was terminated
because of suspicions about his [Sawtelle's] own improper practices." Id.
11. Id. The NASD requires its members to complete this form whenever an employee leaves the
company, listing, among other things, the reason for the employee's discontinuance of employment.
Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 106. On the U-5 Uniform Notice of Termination form prepared by Waddell & Reed for
the NASD, Waddell & Reed responded yes to the question whether Sawtelle was under investigation
by a government body or self regulatory organization. Id. Waddell also stated that Sawtelle was
'under internal review for fraud or wrongful taking of property, or for violating investment-related
statutes, regulations or industry standards of conduct." Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The letters "explained the potential tax liabilities and other fees if the customers transferred
their investments." Id. Similar language was not included in letters sent to customers of a Waddell
broker who was convicted of embezzling funds. Id. The trial court found that the letters "could be
construed as threatening." Id. at 105.
16. Id. "Waddell also rerouted mail from Sawtelle's North Haven, Connecticut office to Waddell's
Hambden, Connecticut office, and transferred Sawtelle's phone calls to Waddell's office." Id.
17. Id. There is some evidence that Waddell "solicited complaints against him by offering custom-
ers improper incentives, such as a waiver of transfer fees." Id. at 106. Although Waddell wrote letters
to his customers the day after he was terminated, Sawtelle did not mail letters to his own customers
until February 2 6 h, 1997. Id. When customers called in response to Waddell's letters, Waddell repre-
sentatives untruthfully told the customers that they did not know where Sawtelle was, "suggesting, on
several occasions, that Sawtelle might have engaged in criminal conduct." Id.
18. Id. at 105.
19. Id. at 106.
[Vol. 2006
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years, a three member arbitration panel found against Waddell & Reed, and
awarded Sawtelle $1,827,499 in compensatory damages and $747,000 in attor-
neys' fees. 20 The arbitration panel also held Waddell & Reed and its president
jointly and severally liable under CUTPA for punitive damages in the sum of $25
million for "their reprehensible conduct in orchestrating a campaign of decep-
,,21tion.
Following the arbitral award, Sawtelle petitioned the New York State Su-
preme Court of New York County to confirm the arbitration panel's award.22
Waddell and its fellow defendants cross-petitioned to vacate or modify the award,
claiming that the punitive damages award was irrational and in manifest disregard
of the law, and that the compensatory damages erroneously included Sawtelle's
attorneys' fees because the fees were separately awarded. 23 The New York Su-
preme Court agreed with Waddell & Reed that the panel had awarded the attor-
neys' fees twice, and accordingly modified the compensatory damage award to
$1,080,499.24 As for the punitive damages, the trial court rejected Waddell &
Reed's argument that the large award violated the standard set forth by the Su-
preme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, by reasoning that Gore dealt
with due process concerns not applicable to arbitration.25 After acknowledging
the limited role of judicial review of arbitral awards, the court affirmed the $25
million award, finding that the punitive damage award was not made irrationally
or in manifest disregard of the law.
26
Waddell & Reed appealed the award of punitive damages and Sawtelle ap-
pealed the reduction of compensatory damages to the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division. The court affirmed the trial court's modification of the
28compensatory damages award, but vacated the punitive damages award. The
20. Id. at 106-07. In 1999, Waddell responded to Sawtelle's claim by filing a claim against Saw-
telle's new employer, Hackett. Id. at 107. The three member arbitration panel consolidated the two
proceedings and dismissed the claims against Hackett on September 11, 2000. Id.
21. Id. In awarding the punitive damages, the arbitration panel found that the campaign of deception
"included giving the impression that Sawtelle had mishandled his clients' investments, was untrust-
worthy, was not authorized to do business and, in some way, had been involved in the embezzlement




24. Id. The trial court found that Sawtelle asked the arbitrators to award the amount of income he
would have received from Waddell in 1997 if he had not been fired because Sawtelle introduced evi-
dence showing that in 1997 he would have received an annualized commission income of $766,861, an
investment bonus of $263,648, and an additional $300,000 in "trails." Id. at 116. While Sawtelle
conceded that Waddell had paid him $250,000 prior to his termination, the net total of the amounts,
after subtracting the 250,000 credit, is $1,080,499. Id. The court recognized that the compensatory
damage award was $1,827,499, approximately $747,000 more than Sawtelle had asked for, which was
also the amount of Sawtelle's attorneys fees. Id. The trial court concluded that because the panel had
separately awarded Sawtelle $747,000 in attorneys fees, the compensatory damages award must have
erroneously included a double award of attorneys fees. Id. The court accordingly reduced the com-
pensatory damages award to $1,080,499. Id. at 115-16.
25. Id. at 107 (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559 (1996)).
26. Sawtelle, 304 A.D.2d at 103, 107. The New York State Supreme Court held that the award was
not "otherwise illegal or irrational as grossly excessive since CUTPA, which authorizes an award of
punitive damages, does not by its terms, place limits on such an award." Id.
27. Id. at 104.
28. Id. at 117-18.
No. 2]
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appellate court reasoned that the Gore standards did govern judicial review of
arbitral awards, and that the punitive damages award was excessive under Gore
and also made in 'manifest disregard' of the law, remanding for further considera-
tion.29
Upon remand, the original three-member arbitration panel held a one day
hearing and issued a second award.30 The panel did not modify the amount of the
punitive damage award, but changed only the description of Waddell & Reed's
conduct in its findings from a "campaign of deception" to a "horrible campaign of
deception, defamation and persecution."
31
Sawtelle again petitioned the New York State Supreme Court in the county of
New York to confirm the punitive damages award and Waddell & Reed moved to
vacate. 32 This time, the trial court applied the Gore standards as mandated by the
Appellate division, found the punitive damages award excessive under such stan-
dards, and vacated the award and remanded to a new arbitration panel. 33 Sawtelle
responded to the vacatur by motioning the trial court to modify its order vacating
and remanding to a new panel and to instead issue a conditional remittitur.' The
trial court recognized several reasons why Sawtelle's request for a conditional
remittitur was reasonable: first, the several appeals and expensive legal fees had
already costs the parties much time and money; second, there was no guarantee
that the new arbitration panel's award would be confirmed by the instant court or
that the appeals would end; and finally, the new arbitration panel was "likely to be
as expensive and time consuming as the first., 35 However, the court was bound
by the FAA and thus without the authority to issue a conditional remitter.
36
Therefore, the trial court denied this motion.
37
To avoid arbitrating in front of a new and unpredictable panel, Sawtelle ap-
pealed both decisions. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, af-
firmed both of the trial court's orders, denying the conditional remitter and grant-
ing the motion to vacate and remand. 39 The appellate court agreed that the issue
should be remanded to a new arbitrational panel, holding that when a court va-
cates an arbitral award on the ground that it is in manifest disregard of the law,
and where the original arbitrators issue an identical award on remand, the court
29. Id. at 109-15.
30. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
31. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 21 A.D.3d 820, 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
32. Sawtelle, 789 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
33. Id. at 858. The trial court stated ,"the panel acted illegally, arbitrarily and beyond the scope of
its authority when it awarded punitive damages so disproportionate to the compensatory damages
awarded. All too aware that the same arbitration panel might not be expected to impartially apply the
Appellate Division's mandate and the Gore standard, this Court remanded with a direction that a differ-
ent panel hear the new (i.e., third) arbitration." Id. at 859.
34. Id. at 858. Instead of remanding the issue to a new arbitration panel, Sawtelle asked the court for
an order that would remand the matter only if the parties could not stipulate to an amount to be
awarded. Id.
35. Id. at 859. The trial court stated: "The history of this arbitration undermines the very purpose of
arbitration: to provide a manner of dispute resolution more swift and economical than litigation in
court. Petitioner's suggestion seems to make sense." Id.
36. Id. at 860.
37. Id.
38. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 21 A.D.3d 820, 820-22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
39. Id. at 821-22.
[Vol. 2006
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should vacate the award and remand to a new arbitration panel to prevent the




Even though the instant dispute occurred in New York state court, it was de-
cided under federal law because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs the
arbitration of employment disputes in the securities industry. 41 The substance and
procedure of the FAA apply in both state and federal courts.4 2 State courts must
apply the FAA consistently with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of the federal law.43 When a state court confronts an issue regarding the FAA that
has not been addressed by the Supreme Court, unanimous lower federal courts
decisions are binding on the state court.44 When lower federal courts have divided
on the FAA issue, the decisions of the federal circuit in which the state court sits
are persuasive authority.
45
The FAA, enacted in 1925, established a "liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
,,46tration agreements. As part of this policy, the FAA limits judicial review of
arbitration awards in order to preserve the goals of arbitration: speed, economy,
and finality. 47 Theoretically, courts have justified the limited judicial review of
arbitral awards by inferring from the decision to arbitrate a belief, on behalf of the
parties, that the speed and economy of arbitration outweighs the risk that an arbi-
trator will misapply the law.
48
Under the FAA, a reviewing court may vacate an award where: (1) the award
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there was evident partial-
40. Id. at 821.
41. Matter of Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, Pier, Fenner & Smith, 85 N.Y.2d 173, 180 (N.Y. 1995).
"[T]he provisions of the FAA are controlling even though the dispute itself may arise under State law
(see supra, Southland Corp. v Keating). Thus, regardless of what our own State's policies or case law
might dictate in other circumstances, we are bound by the policies embodied in the Federal statute and
the accompanying case law, and our prior state law holdings remain independently operative only to
the extent that they have not been preempted by federal law and policy." Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody
& Co., 81 N.Y.2d 623, 630-31 (N.Y. 1993). The FAA was also controlling in the instant dispute
because the parties were from different states, thus implicating interstate commerce and the FAA.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
42. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984). "In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S., at 1, 25, n. 32, we reaffirmed our view that the Arbitration Act
'creates a body of federal substantive law' and expressly stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, i. e.,
the substantive law the Act created was applicable in state and federal courts." Id. "[W]e cannot
believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 15.
43. Id.
44. Fletcher, 81 N.Y.2d at 631-32. "We are bound to follow both the holding and the rationale of
the Nation's highest Court on this and other questions of Federal law when, as here, there is no ambigu-
ity in the Court's position." Id.
45. See Flanagan v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 500, 505-06 (N.Y. 1986).
46. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
47. Norman S. Posner, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64
BROOK. L. REV. 471, 503 (1998).
48. Rubins, supra note 2, at 367.
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ity or corruption in the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct; or
(4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 49 In addition to these four statutory
grounds, each federal circuit has recognized a judicially created, non-statutory
ground for vacating arbitration awards, and manifest disregard of the law is the
most common non-statutory ground for vacatur.
51
B. Manifest Disregard of the Law
The doctrine of manifest disregard stems from Justice Reed's statement in a
1953 Supreme Court case, Wilko v. Swan, that "the interpretations of the law by
the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation., 52 Although the Supreme
Court overruled Wilko in 1989, 53 Justice Reed's manifest disregard statement has
survived.54 In 1995, the Supreme Court cited to Justice Reed's manifest disregard
statement with approval, acknowledging that arbitral awards made in manifest
disregard of the law may be vacated.
Although the Supreme Court and each federal circuit recognize the doctrine
of manifest disregard, the precise definition of the doctrine of manifest disregard
varies slightly by the circuit.56 The prevailing definition, used by at least ten of
49. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
50. Rubins, supra note 2, at 369.
51. Posner, supra note 47, at 512-23.
Although the courts usually articulate the non-statutory ground as "manifest disregard of the
law," some courts have applied other labels to it, either in combination with or as a substitute for
the manifest disregard standard. Thus, courts have held that an arbitration award may be vacated
if it violates public policy, is completely irrational, is arbitrary and capricious, is fundamentally
unfair, is an abuse of discretion, or does not 'draw its essence' from the agreement to arbitrate.
Id.
52. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (U.S. 1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
53. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
54. See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); Posner, supra note 47, at 505-06.
55. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "The Supreme Court has
also indicated that arbitration awards can be vacated if they are in 'manifest disregard of the law."' Id.
First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 'The court will set that [arbitral] decision aside
only in very unusual circumstances. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (award procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means; arbitrator exceeded his powers); Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (parties bound by arbitrator's
decision not in "manifest disregard" of the law).
56. First Circuit:
The test for a challenge to an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law is set out in Ad-
vest, Inc. v. McCarthy: a successful challenge... depends upon the challenger's ability to show
that the award is "(1) unfounded in reason and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that
no judge, or group of judges, ever could conceivably have made such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly
based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact."
Prudential-Bache Secs. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 238 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Advest, Inc., v. McCarthy,
914 F.2d 6, 8-9). Third Circuit: In order to vacate under doctrine of manifest disregard "there must be
absolutely no support at all in the record justifying the arbitrator's detenminations for a court to deny
enforcement of an award." United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376,
379 (3d Cir. 1995). Fourth Circuit: "Appellant is required to show that the arbitrators were aware of
the law, understood it correctly, found it applicable to the case before them, and yet chose to ignore it
in propounding their decision." Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1994).
Fifth Circuit: "The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived
by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that
the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing principle but decides to ignore or pay no
[Vol. 2006
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the twelve circuits, requires the court to find both that (1) the arbitrator knew of a
governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2)
the law ignored by the arbitrator was "well-defined, explicit and clearly applicable
to the case." 57
The Second Circuit has adopted this definition for the doctrine of manifest
disregard. 58 Second Circuit case law explains that this standard requires the arbi-
trator's mistake to be so obvious that the average arbitrator would "readily and
instantly" recognize the mistake.59 Even if the mistake is blatantly apparent, the
court cannot vacate the arbitral award under the manifest disregard standard if the
arbitrator offers "even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached." 6
Further, the court must find subjective knowledge of the well-defined law on be-
half of the arbitrators before vacatur under manifest disregard is appropriate.
61
While the precise definition of manifest disregard differs by circuit, the fed-
eral courts are unanimous in strictly limiting the doctrine. 62 If the doctrine were
not so curtailed, it would threaten the very premise of arbitration-finality-by
increasing the risk that parties losing in arbitration would successfully seek vaca-
tur under manifest disregard grounds.63 The circuits have thus limited the doctrine
attention to it." Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003)
(citing Merrill Lynch, Piere, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986)).
Sixth Circuit: "An arbitration panel does not act in manifest disregard of the law unless (1) the appli-
cable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators
refused to heed that legal principle." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421
(6th Cir. 1995). Seventh Circuit:
In any event, to vacate an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law, there must be
something beyond and different from mere error in law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to
understand or apply the law; it must be demonstrated that the majority of arbitrators deliberately
disregarded what they knew to be the law in order to reach the result they did.
Health Services Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Second
Circuit case law, Venice v. Holt Industries, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1302 (D.N.Y. 1981)). Eighth Circuit:
Manifest disregard of the law exists when the arbitrator commits an error that was "obvious and
capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an
arbitrator." Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence
of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.
Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)). Ninth Circuit: Although an arbitration
award may be vacated for "manifest disregard of the law," the record must clearly demonstrate that the
arbitrator "recognized the applicable law and then ignored it." ABC Int'l Traders, Inc. v. Fun 4 All
Corp., 79 Fed. Appx. 346, 348 (9th Cir. 2003). Tenth Circuit: "A finding of manifest disregard means
the record will show the arbitrators knew the law and explicitly disregarded it." Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Circuit: "Arbitration awards may be
vacated if they are in 'manifest disregard of the law."' Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255,
1261 (11 th Cir. 2003). DC Circuit: "The 'manifest disregard of law' standard must be defined in light
of the bases underlying the Court's decisions in Gilmer-type cases." Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs.,
323 U.S. App. D.C. 133 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
57. Rubins, supra note 2, at 369. See supra, note 56, circuits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
58. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2nd Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 933.
60. Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G. 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2nd Cir. 1978).
61. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.
62. Posner, supra note 47, at 503.
63. United Steelworkers of America v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). "The
Supreme Court has explained that heightened judicial review by a court of the merits would make
meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be
No. 2]
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in order to comply with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, and to pre-
serve the efficient nature of arbitration.
64
C. Punitive Damages
Federal appellate courts can overturn a trial court's punitive damage award on
the ground of excessiveness. When courts award punitive damages, the amount of
the award cannot be so unexpected or irrationally high that it violates the offend-
ing party's constitutional right to due process. 65 In BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,66 the United States Supreme Court explained that a punitive damages
award, grossly excessive in relation to the State's legitimate interests in punish-
ment and deterrence, enters "the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 67 The proper inquiry for determining
excessiveness, according to Gore, is whether the punitive damages have a rational
relationship to the actual and potential harm caused by the defendant's conduct.
6 8
The Court emphasized that the question of unconstitutionally excessive punitive
awards can not be determined by reference to a set ratio between actual and puni-
tive damages or a "simple mathematical formula." 69 Rather, Gore requires courts
to analyze the question of unconstitutional excessiveness in light of three relevant
factors: (1) "the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; ' 70 (2) how
the punitive damages compare to "actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff;"' 71 and (3)
how the punitive damages compare to "civil or criminal penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct."72 Almost every federal circuit has not only
applied the Gore factors, but also cited the Supreme Court's rejection of a "simple
mathematical formula" with approval.73
final." Id; Hans Smit, Manifest Disregard of the Law in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, First Department, 15 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 111, 121 (2004).
64. Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Merrill
Lynch, Piere, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986). "A less strict
standard of judicial review would be to undermine our well established deference to arbitration as a
favored method of settling disputes when agreed to by the parties." Id.
65. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). "Elementary notions of fairness
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose." Id.
66. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
67. Id. at 568.
68. Id. at 581.
69. Id. at 582.
70. Id. at 575.
71. Id. at 580.
72. Id. at 583.
73. The first circuit has noted "that the Supreme Court has 'dismissed any simple, mathematical
formula in favor of general inquiry into reasonableness."' Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 117 (1st Cir.
2001) (quoting Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 223 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000)). Third: The constitution-
ally acceptable range is not reducible to a 'simple mathematical formula,' .. Rather, the ratio of puni-
tive damages to the harm caused by the defendant is a tool to ensure that the two bear a reasonable
relationship to each other. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 426 (2003). Fourth: "Indeed, the Supreme Court clarifies in BMW that it has "consistently
rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one
that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award..." Jordan v. Shaw Indus., 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 33589 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). Fifth: ."The principle that
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Even if the constitutionality of the punitive damage award is not questioned,
it can be overturned as excessive. The non-constitutional standard for excessive-
ness in most circuits, including the Second Circuit, is whether the award is "so
high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice." 74 De-
exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to compensatory damages has a long pedi-
gree." Gore, 517 U.S. at 580 (citations omitted). But, the Court has 'consistently rejected the notion
that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula'. Id. at 582. 'We need not,
and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.' Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 18, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991)."' Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 156 F.3d
581, 597 (5th Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit has recognized that the Court "declined again to impose a
bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed," Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 436 F.3d
594, 606 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425). Courts in the Seventh circuit have
quoted the Gore language with approval: "We have consistently rejected the notion that the constitu-
tional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential
damages to the punitive award." Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7454 (D.
Wis. 2006). Eighth: "As the Supreme Court noted in Gore, there is no "simple mathematical formula"
that marks the constitutional line." Boemer v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 603
(8th Cir. 2005) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). Ninth: the Court "rejected the notion that the constitu-
tional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential
damages to the punitive award," Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coali-
tion of Life Activists, 422 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). Tenth: "Of
course, we have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple
mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award."
Progressive Motors v. Frazier, 220 B.R. 476, 479 (D. Utah 1998). Eleventh: "The Supreme Court has
not delineated 'a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages
to the punitive award."' U.S. EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 615 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gore,
517 U.S. at 582).
74. Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent
Ass'n of New York, Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir.1998)). First Circuit: "We have expressed the
extent of distortion that warrants intervention by requiring such awards to be so large as to 'shock the
judicial conscience."' Nydam v. Lennerton, 948 F.2d 808, 811 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Caldarera v. E.
Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983)). Third Circuit: "We may disturb the district court's
determination with respect to a remittitur only for abuse of discretion, and reverse and grant a new trial
'only if the verdict is 'so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience."" Gumbs v. Pueblo
Int'l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Edynak v. Atl. Shipping, Inc. 562 F.2d 215, 225-
226 (3rd Cir. 1977). Fourth Circuit: "Our review of the punitive damage awards here is limited to
whether 'the verdict is so grossly excessive so as to shock the judicial conscience."' Thorne v. Wise,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2844 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gumbs, 823 F.2d at 771). Fifth Circuit: "Unless
an award is so 'inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that
passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial, the jury's determination of the
fact is considered inviolate."' Taylor v. Green, 868 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Garrick v.
City & County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 972 (10th Cir. 1981). Sixth Circuit: "the standard is
'[w]hether the award is so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice."'
Mitchell v. Associated Bldg. Contractors, Inc., 884 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Rodgers v.
Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 739 F.2d 1102, 1109 (6th Cir. 1984). Eighth Circuit: "[WIe
review the size of the compensatory award 'with a keen sense of respect for the latitude given to ju-
ries,' and will order remittitur only if the verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience."
Rowe v. Hussman Corp., 381 F.3d 775, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kucia v. Se. Ark. Cmty. Action
Corp., 284 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 2002). Tenth Circuit: "T'his court has said many times that absent
an award so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and raise an irresistible infer-
ence that passion, prejudice or another improper cause invaded the trial, the jury's determination of the
amount of damages is inviolate." Lane v. Gorman, 347 F.2d 332, 335 (10th Cir. 1965). Eleventh
Circuit: Unless an award is so inadequate "as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresisti-
ble inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the trial, the jury's
determination of fact is considered inviolate." Murphy v. Flagler Beach, 846 F.2d 1306, 1310 (11 th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Garrick v. City & County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 972 (10th Cir. 1981).
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spite the due process focus of Gore, courts in the Second Circuit have used the
three Gore factors to guide this non-constitutional inquiry.
75
Although Gore dealt with constitutional limits on punitive damage awards,
the federal courts agree that constitutional due process protections do not extend
to private arbitration.76 The federal courts have recognized that the state action
required to trigger due process protection is absent in judicial confirmation of
punitive damage awards.
Although arbitration does not implicate the due process concerns at issue in
Gore, courts in the Second Circuit have used the Gore factors to review arbitral
punitive damages award.78 In Sanders v. Gardner, the United States District
Court for the Eastem District of New York analyzed an arbitral punitive damage
award of $10,000,000. 79 In applying the three Gore factors, the court focused on
the legitimate state interest in punishing and deterring federal security regulation
violations and the Supreme Court's rejection of a categorical approach to the ac-
tual/punitive damages ratio. 80 Since the court found that the offending party had
acted with "greed, avarice, and fraud," the court used the Gore factors to uphold a
punitive damage award that was fifty times as large as the compensatory dam-
ages.81
Similarly, in Acciardo v. Millennium Securities Corporation,8 2 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York decided whether an
arbitral punitive damages award was excessive by applying the Gore factors. The
court, like the Sanders court, highlighted the Supreme Court's refusal to draw a
"mathematical bright line" for acceptable and non-acceptable actual/punitive
83damage ratios. The court then held that since the arbitration panel had made a
specific finding of malice, it was within the arbitrator's authority to issue a puni-
tive damage award that was twenty times the amount of actual damages.8 4
75. Lee, 101 F.3d at 809.
76. Second Circuit: Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151, 174 (E.D.N.Y., 1998). Seventh Circuit:
"Private arbitration, however, really is private; and since constitutional rights are in general rights
against government officials and agencies rather than against private individuals and organizations, the
fact that a private arbitrator denies the procedural safeguards that are encompassed by the term "due
process of law" cannot give rise to a constitutional complaint." Elmore v. Chi. & fll. Midland R.R.
Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986). Eighth Circuit: "In the arbitration setting we have almost none
of the protections that fundamental fairness and due process require for the imposition of this form of
punishment." Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 802-03 (8th Cir. 2004)
(en banc). Ninth Circuit: "This court recently held that 'neither private arbitration nor the judicial act
of enforcing it under the FAA constitutes state action."' VisionQuest Nat'l v. Marimed Found., 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 15340 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182
(9th Cir. 1998)). Eleventh Circuit: "We agree with the numerous courts that have held that the state
action element of a due process claim is absent in private arbitration cases." Davis v. Prudential Sec.,
Incc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (1 lth Cir 1995).
77. See Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 263 nn. 201, 207-
08 (2006).
78. Sanders, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 177-78; Acciardo v. Millenium Secs. Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422
(S.D.N.Y 2000).
79. Sanders, 7 F.Supp. 2d at 156-57.
80. Id. at 176-77
81. Id. at 177-79.
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WV. INSTANT DECISION
In Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed 5 the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court revisited a dispute over an arbitral award of punitive damages." The
court's opinion began by noting that although the instant court had vacated the
punitive damage award on a prior appeal, the arbitration panel had awarded Saw-
telle the same amount of punitive damages on remand.87 The court identified only
one difference between the two awards: the description of Waddell & Reed's con-
duct changed from a "campaign of deception" to a "horrible campaign of decep-
tion, defamation and persecution." 88 The court reasoned that this change did not
provide adequate justification for the panel's decision to award $25 million in
punitive damages. 9 Although the court noted that arbitrators are not required to
explain their initial awards on remand, the court clarified that, in the instant case,
neither the presence nor the absence of such an explanation could have eliminated
the possibility of modification or vacatur on appeal. 90
The court explained that it previously vacated the initial punitive damages
award of $25 million because the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law
by awarding punitive damages that were grossly disproportionate to the actual
harm Sawtelle suffered.91 It follows, the court reasoned, that when an arbitral
award is vacated on manifest disregard grounds, arbitrators cannot simply ignore
the court's holding on remand and reissue the same award.92 After discussing the
limited amount of actual harm to Sawtelle by pointing out that he did not lose
many clients or income, the court declared that when punitive damages are
twenty-three times actual damages, the punitive award necessarily conflicts with
established law and is per se arbitrary.
9 3
As for Sawtelle's motion for an order remitting the matter to a new panel
unless the parties stipulated to the amount to be awarded, the court agreed with the
trial court that a reviewing court would impermissibly exceed their limited role if
it issued such an order.94 After explaining that reviewing courts can only confirm,
modify, or vacate arbitral awards, the court affirmed the trial court's order deny-
ing the conditional remitter, vacating the second award of punitive damages, and
remanding to a new arbitration panel.95
85. 21 A.D.3d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
86. Id. at 820.
87. Id. at 821.
88. Id.






94. Id. at 821-22.
95. Id. at 820. The court rejected Sawtelle's argument that the remand to a new panel would unnec-
essarily increase the length of the proceedings because the new arbitration panel could review the same
submissions considered by the initial panel. Id. at 821-22.
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V. COMMENT
In Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Di-
vision expanded the doctrine of manifest disregard by holding that an arbitral
award of punitive damages can be vacated under the manifest disregard doctrine
when the amount of punitive damages is grossly disproportionate to actual harm.
9 6
This decision was governed by the FAA, and so the court interpreted and applied
a federal law that is substantively and procedurally applicable in both state and
federal courts. 9 7 The instant court's decision relied on precedent set forth by the
United States Supreme Court and the circuit in which it sits-the Second Circuit.
98
While the doctrine of manifest disregard is a well-established ground for va-
catur under federal law, the courts have limited its impact by construing this doc-
trine of judicial review narrowly.99 If the doctrine were construed broadly to ex-
pand judicial review of arbitral awards, the increased risk of lengthy and expen-
sive appeals of arbitral awards would threaten the arbitral goals of efficiency and
finality. Recognizing these concerns, and in light of the strong federal policy in
favor of arbitration, courts have restricted the doctrine of manifest disregard
through difficult burdens of proof.1°° The Sawtelle court cited to Second Circuit
case law to support its use of the manifest disregard doctrine in its application of
federal law.10 1 This standard, which is the most common formulation of manifest
disregard, strictly limits vacatur under the manifest disregard grounds to arbitral
awards clearly governed by a well-established legal principle. 1°2 Therefore, by
holding that certain punitive awards can be vacated on manifest disregard
96. Id. at 821.
97. See supra notes 41-42.
98. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA is binding on the state court, and although Sec-
ond Circuit authority is only binding on the state court's application of federal law when the Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue and all the federal circuits are in agreement, the state court is located
within the geographical borders of the Second Circuit and so it is not surprising that the state court
would rely more heavily on Second Circuit case law than other circuits. See supra notes 42-46.
99. Posner, supra note 47, at 504.
100. See supra note 56. For example, the Second Circuit will only vacate awards under the manifest
disregard standard that lack "even a barely colorable justification." Andros Compania Maritima, S.A.
v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G. 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2d Cir. 1978).
101. Sawtelle, 21 A.D.3d at 821. Immediately after stating that the basis for vacatur was the manifest
disregard ground, the instant court cited to the 1998 Second Circuit case, Halligan v. Piper Jaffray,
Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998). This case repeats the above quoted standard for vacating an arbitral
award made in manifest disregard of the law:
[t]he reach of the doctrine [ manifest disregard of the law] is "severely limited." Indeed, we have
cautioned that manifest disregard "clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with re-
spect to the law." We have further noted that to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a
court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to ap-
ply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, ex-
plicit, and clearly applicable to the case.
Halligan, 148 F.3d 197, 202 (quoting Government of India v. Cargill, Inc., 867 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir.
1989); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986);
DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997)). Because the federal circuits
are unanimous in strictly limiting this doctrine, the state court is bound by these limitations. See also
supra notes 44, 62.
102. Id. See also supra note 57.
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grounds, the Sawtelle court implied that the law governing excessive damages was
"well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable."
103
The Sawtelle court identified two types of arbitral punitive awards that could
be vacated under the doctrine of manifest disregard. 1°4 First, an arbitral award of
punitive damages can be vacated on manifest disregard grounds when the punitive
damages are "grossly disproportionate to the actual harm sustained by peti-
tioner."' 10 5 Second, the court stated a twenty-three to one ratio between punitive
and actual damages "can only be construed as arbitrary." 1° 6 If the twenty-three to
one ratio between punitive and actual damages is necessarily arbitrary, the award
must lack the "barely colorable justification" required to survive vacatur under the
manifest disregard doctrine.107 In order for the court to have held that these types
of punitive awards are appropriate grounds for manifest disregard, the court's
logic must have been to find that both the law against punitive arbitral awards that
are grossly disproportionate to the actual harm sustained, and the legal principle
barring punitive awards that are twenty-three times actual damages, are "well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.""1 8
Although the standard used mandates a finding of clearly established, appli-
cable law to support the court's holding, no clear cut formula for determining
when punitive awards are impermissibly excessive exists.10 9 The United States
Supreme Court has "consistently rejected the notion" that "a simple mathematical
formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive
award," can determine when a punitive award is impermissibly excessive.110
While the Gore court noted that a ratio between punitive and actual damages of
500 to 1 would "surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow,"' the Supreme Court
refused to adopt a bright line rule that even a 500 to 1 ratio would automatically
make the award excessive.'11 Almost federal circuit, including the Second Cir-
cuit, has explicitly cited the Supreme Court's rejection of a "simple mathematical
formula" for determining excessiveness of punitive awards 112 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit "refused" to rely exclusively on the ratio between punitive and
actual damages to determine whether a punitive award was excessive.113 Even
New York state law is in accord: the New York state courts have held that "there
is no rigid formula by which the amount of punitive damages are fixed."'1 4 New
York state courts also agree that while the ratio between punitive and actual dam-
ages should be reasonable, the question of excessiveness cannot be decided by a
simple mathematical limit on the ratio.
115




107. Sanders v. Gardener, 7 F.Supp.2d 151, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
108. Id. at 158. See also supra note 104.
109. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996).
110. Id. at 582.
111. Id. at 583 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,481 (1993)).
112. Supra note 73; Disorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 187 (2d Cir. 2003).
113. Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1996).
114. I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 16 A.D.2d 461, 467 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962); Deborah S.
v. Diorio, 153 Misc. 2d 708, 711 (N.Y. civ. ct. 1992).
115. Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 269 (N.Y. App. Div.1975).
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While the courts have uniformly declined to adopt a bright line approach to
determine the reasonableness of punitive awards, the United States Supreme Court
has identified three factors that should be examined when deciding if a punitive
damages award is excessive.1 1 6 Some courts have held that Gore does not apply
to a court's review of arbitral awards because Gore dealt with a claim that the
punitive damages award was so excessive that it violated the defendant's due
process rights, and it is well-settled that judicial review of arbitral awards does not
involve the requisite state action to trigger due process protections.1 7 However,
several courts in the Second Circuit have used the Gore factors to examine
whether an arbitral award is excessive, even when the constitutionality of the
award is not challenged.' 1 8 While courts in the Second Circuit have used the Gore
factors to examine arbitral punitive awards, the Gore factors have been used to
confirm, never vacate, the arbitral award.' 19 Moreover, such courts have used the
Gore factors to confirm arbitral punitive damages awards that are twenty and fifty
times actual damages.
1 20
Despite the uniform rejection of a bright line approach, the Sawtelle court de-
clared that when an arbitration panel awards punitive damages twenty-three times
the amount of actual damages, that panel has acted in manifest disregard of the
law. 121 The court states that such an award "can only be construed as arbitrary"
even though the United States Supreme Court, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and New York state courts have consistently rejected the idea that the ratio
between punitive and actual damages are per se determinative of when a punitive
damages award is excessive.12 2 The Sawtelle court also states that a punitive
damages award twenty-three times greater than actual damages is "irreconcilable
with prevailing authority" even though Second Circuit courts have confirmed
arbitral punitive awards that are twenty and fifty times actual damages.1 23 Finally,
while binding federal case law recognizes three factors as relevant to the inquiry
of excessive punitive awards, Sawtelle ignores the factor that the Supreme Court
has emphasized as most important: the reprehensibility of the defendant's con-
duct. 124 Rather, the court identifies one of the three relevant factors-the relation-
ship between punitive damages and the amount of actual harm inflicted on the
plaintiff-as independently sufficient to vacate an arbitral punitive damages
award as excessive under the manifest disregard doctrine.'
25
The instant decision presents a radical departure from the previously undis-
puted treatment of the bright line approach to punitive awards. The fact that the
116. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75. The three factors are: (1) degree of reprehensibility of defendant's
conduct; (2) ratio of punitive damages to actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) civil
or criminal penalties that the state could impose for comparable misconduct. Id.
117. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc. 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). "This court
held Gore inapplicable to private arbitrations because the Due Process Clause of the 14
th Amendment
is not applicable absent state action." Id. See supra notes 76-77.
118. Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151, 177-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Acciardo v. Millenium Secs.
Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 413,422 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
119. Sanders, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 177-79; Acciardo, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
120. Id.
121. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 21 A.D.3d 820, 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
122. Supra notes 11-15.
123. Sanders, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 177-79; Acciardo, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
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bright line rule was used to justify vacatur under the manifest disregard doctrine is
significant because the underlying premise of the doctrine is that the scope of
review is considerably narrower than the scope of review that an appellate court
applies to the judgment of a trial court. 126 If the Sawtelle court found a twenty-
three to one ratio excessive under a limited form of judicial review, and judicial
review of trial court awards is more rigorous than judicial review of arbitral
awards, then courts would have even greater authority to reverse a trial court's
punitive award if it exceeded the twenty-three to one ratio.
127
The instant case illustrates why the doctrine of manifest disregard is limited
to issues governed by clearly defined legal principles. When a court vacates an
award under the manifest disregard doctrine and remands it to arbitrators, there is
a risk that the court will not confirm the new arbitral award, and will force the
parties to arbitrate for a third time with the possibility of further appeals. The
doctrine of manifest disregard addresses and attempts to limit this problem by
allowing awards to be vacated on such grounds only when the governing law is
clear and well-defined. When the governing legal principle is well-settled, there is
less room for the arbitrators and the courts to disagree on its application and thus
the appropriate result.
In the instant case, for example, the definition of excessive punitive awards
was not well-settled prior to the instant decision. The only clearly defined law at
the time of remand was the Supreme Court's holding that three factors should
guide the inquiry, with special emphasis on one factor-the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct-as the most important of the three.128 As such, an argument
could be made that punitive damages were awarded in conformity with the law on
remand. The panel's single change on remand in the description of the defen-
dant' s conduct-a "campaign of deception" to a "horrible campaign of deception,
defamation, and persecution 129-addressed "the reprehensibility of the defen-
dant's conduct." 13u The argument follows that instead of "obdurately issu[ing] an
identical determination," as the court claimed,' 31 the panel appears to have
changed the description of Waddell & Reed's conduct to reflect their appreciation
of the legal significance of this factor. In order to accept the instant court's hold-
ing as logically sound, however, this interpretation must fail to provide "an even
barely colorable justification."'132
Ironically, the instant dispute would likely have been resolved quicker and
less expensively through litigation.' 33 As noted by the New York State Supreme
126. See Posner, supra note 47, at 503.
127. In order for arbitration to maintain its goals of speed and economy, arbitral awards must be final.
Judicial review of arbitral awards is strictly limited to minimize the risk that arbitral awards will be
vacated and thus preserve the element of finality attributed to arbitral awards. See supra notes 62-64.
It necessarily follows that a court's ordinary judicial review, of trial court awards, is not so strictly
limited.
128. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559, 575 (1996).
129. Sawtelle, 21 A.D.3d 820, 821.
130. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
131. Sawtelle, 21 A.D.3d 820, 821.
132. Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G. 579 F.2d 691,704 (2d Cir. 1978).
133. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc. 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). The Trial Court
stated: "'The history of this arbitration undermines the very purpose of arbitration: to provide a manner
of dispute resolution more swift and economical than litigation in court." Id.
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Court, the courts would have been able to issue a conditional remittitur 1 4 if a trial
court, rather than an arbitration panel, had awarded the punitive damages.'3 5 Had
the court issued conditional remittitur, the parties could have avoided going to
arbitration again by stipulating to the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded. 13 6 However, judicial review of arbitral awards is strictly limited to pre-
vent courts from issuing orders, like a conditional remittitur, that would "funda-
mentally affect the merits."' 37 Such limitations were implemented to foster the
speed and finality of arbitral awards, but here, the limitations prevented the courts
from issuing an order--conditional remittitur-that could have reduced the delay
and expense of the instant dispute.'
38
VI. CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the court inappropriately used the doctrine of manifest dis-
regard. The law governing when punitive damages awards are excessive is not
settled. Although the doctrine of manifest disregard allows remand only in cir-
cumstances of well-settled law, the court used this doctrine to overturn the arbitra-
tor's award as excessive. This case illustrates why limitations of judicial review
of arbitral award should remain limited. Although the parties contractually as-
sumed the risk of misapplied law in exchange for economy and finality by agree-
ing to arbitrate, the parties did not receive the benefit of their bargain. 39 Instead
of receiving a speedy alternative to litigation, the parties' agreement to arbitrate
resulted in a dispute between arbitrators and judges over a legal principle, span-
ning over eight years, five appeals, and two remands to arbitration panels.1
40
LINDSAY BIESTERFELD
134. Conditional Remittitur is "the process by which a court requires either that the case be retried, or
that the damages awarded by the jury be reduced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (8th ed. 2004);
the Supreme Court explains conditional remittitur as:
When an excessive verdict is given, it is usual for the judge to suggest to counsel to agree on a
sum, to prevent the necessity of a new trial. In the absence of agreement the Court has no power
to reduce the damages to a reasonable sum instead of ordering a new trial.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 480 (U.S. 1935).
135. Sawtelle, 789 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
Petitioner's suggestion seems to make sense. If New York law now permits a court to vacate an
arbitration award of punitive damages solely on the ground of excessiveness, because it is dis-
proportionate under Gore, then a court should be able to modify that award in the same way that
the court would modify a legally excessive jury verdict.
Id.
136. Sawtelle, 21 A.D. 3d at 821.
137. Id. at 822.
138. The trial court explained, following remand, that:
Petitioner's suggestion seems to make sense. If New York law now permits a court to vacate an
arbitration award of punitive damages solely on the ground of excessiveness, because it is dis-
proportionate under Gore, then a court should be able to modify that award in the same way that
the court would modify a legally excessive jury verdict.
Sawtelle, 789 N.Y.S.2d at 859. However, "A court's power to modify an award issued in an arbitration
conducted pursuant to the FAA is governed, and strictly limited by, [the FAA.]" Id. at 860.
139. See Rubins, supra note 2 at 367.
140. The trial court stated, in the opinion directly preceeding the instant decision, "The history of this
arbitration undermines the very purpose of arbitration: to provide a manner of dispute resolution more
swift and economical than litigation in court." Sawtelle, 789 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
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